An illusion is a result of a discrepancy between the physical reality and an individual's perception of it. Animals use their senses to form a representation of their environment, but sensory information and its processing are not free of constraints. For example, to form a representation of the 3D reality, our visual system constructs the missing third dimension from the 2D projection of the environment on our retinas. Usually there are many possible 3D interpretations for a given retinal projection, and sometimes our representation of reality is based on an incorrect interpretation.
Protective coloration is one of the fields where illusions may be particularly important. Color patterns of many prey species decrease the amount of visual information emitted or induce false interpretation of it to manipulate predators' impression of the presence or the appearance of the prey. Predators' perception of the cues and signals emitted by a prey is an important determinant of prey survival. Therefore, signals and cues may be selected to make use of shortcomings in the predator's perception. Also, behavioral adaptations can contribute to this. For example, background preference by prey can in various ways increase the probability of the prey being perceived by predators as a part of the background (Kjernsmo and Merilaita 2012) .
Some classic categories of protective coloration, such as disruptive coloration, have been formed on the basis of appearance and assumed optical effects of the coloration that would correspond to multiple, potentially conflicting selection pressures (Stevens and Merilaita 2009 ). Such indistinctness is problematic for evolutionary research of color patterns. To understand natural selection imposed on protective coloration, we would ideally need to focus on the function of coloration and the perceptual mechanisms it targets.
In their review, focus on animal communication, mainly protective coloration and sexual signaling, and use the concept of illusions to approach these adaptations. A skeptic may worry that the risk that promotion of an umbrella term, such as "deception" or "illusions," might only results in relabeling and reclassification of previous knowledge and concepts and possibly generate a hype, in the worst case the only positive effects being limited within publication statistics. It may, however, also induce a scientifically fruitful process. Such new perspective may help to generate novel hypotheses and point new directions for research by helping to identify and bring together common denominators between topics that previously have not been considered jointly (e.g., How and Zanker 2014) .
The main benefit of the use of the concept illusions is that it shifts our focus onto perception and cognitive processes that underlie the adaptations of animal communication. As the review points out, this is not a new insight. For example, many forms of protective coloration have traditionally been assumed to rely on predators' way of perceiving the physical reality and any weaknesses therein. Despite this awareness, when the research on visual antipredator coloration has dealt with cognition, it has often focused only on the early stages of visual perception, typically photoreceptor sensitivities, whereas higher level processes have received much less attention. A central message of this review is that there is much more to fetch from psychology about other processes of perception and cognition that are potentially relevant for behavior ecologists. The role of an illusion, however, needs to be confirmed in behavioral ecologically and taxonomically relevant setups as the occurrence and nature of illusions may differ between taxa, as the review points out.
Perception is one of the most impressive products of natural selection. Illusions remind us that there are uncertainties and weaknesses associated with perceptual abilities. How these weaknesses in turn power natural selection to shape communication in and appearances of animals provides an extremely fascinating area to study. This review urges us to tackle these questions and shows that there exists much knowledge that can be used to generate new, unexplored hypotheses.
It seems sensible that our senses should provide us with an accurate perception of the world around us. But this is seldom, if ever, true for 2 reasons: they are limited by basic constraints on perceptual systems, and even in the absence of constraints, an unerring account of the world may not be good for our genes. Perceptual accuracy is limited by our senses in numerous ways. For example, there is an inverse correlation between spatial and temporal resolution, on the one hand, and visual sensitivity on the other. Thus, animals operating in low-light environments will have a less accurate view of the world than those in high-light environments (Rosenthal 2007) . In this case and in many others, we assume that perceptual accuracy would promote fitness: discriminating predator sounds from background noise, identifying close relatives, and knowing when it is about to rain can all contribute to Darwinian success. In other cases, as Trivers (2011) argues, self-deception can Stevens • Confusion and illusion be advantageous; for example, allowing the weak to bluff resource holding potential without revealing the tell-tale signs of a liar or allowing some of us to view the glass as half full, whereas other see it as half empty. Thus, sometimes, we do not see the world as it is because we lack the necessary perceptual machinery and other times because selection favors a deceptive view of the world.
Numerous studies have shown how constraints on sensory end organs (eyes, ears, and noses) influence a receiver's response to signals and how these receiver biases, in turn, shape the evolution of signal design (reviewed in Ryan and Cummings 2013) . But these end organs are where perception begins, not where it ends, as biases in perception pile up at all levels in the brain. Sometimes, these biases are so extreme we call them illusions. As Guilford and Dawkins (1991) pointed out in a paper of monumental importance to this field, "Even in perception of lightness and colour, the brain distorts incoming sensory data to construct its own illusory version of the world outside" (see also Rosenthal 2007) . This is the focus of the review by : what visual illusions do the brain create, how do these illusions influence receiver responses to signals, and how do senders evolve signals to exploit these illusions?
The authors make it clear that we know much more about the psychology of illusions as it applies to signals directed at predators than as it applies to social signals. Disruptive coloration, threatening eye spots, startle signals, and memorable colors of prey all tweak the predator's psychology to enhance the prey's survivorship. This wealth of knowledge contrasts greatly with the sparsity of such studies of social and especially sexual interactions. True, Endler, and his colleagues (Endler et al. 2010) argue that male greater bowerbirds arrange their bower decorations to elicit the illusion of forced perspective from females viewing the court from the bower. But much of the current work on visual biases in mate preferences has not advanced much since Endler (1978) drew our attention to the importance of visual signals from the receiver's point of view and proscribed a method for quantifying this phenomenon in the context of signal colors and contrast (Endler 1990 ). These studies advanced the field by integrating photoreceptor sensitivity with putative color opponency systems to understand how signals evolve to enhance contrast (reviewed in Ryan and Cummings 2013) . But the majority of these studies stop at the periphery; they do not show that the visual contrast models predict receiver responses in the target species nor do they conduct the behavioral experiments necessary to reveal how the signals are perceived by the brain and what, if any, illusions they instantiate.
The review by combined with the insightful review of visual signaling by Rosenthal (2007) , hopefully, will mark a new chapter in studies of visual ecology by reminding us that all visual tracts lead to the brain and that the biases in percepts generated by the brain, whether illusory or not, contribute to the psychological landscapes that shape the evolution of signal design.
Albert Einstein once famously remarked that "reality is merely an illusion, albeit a very persistent one." In the hallmark of Einstein, this simple phrase encapsulates worlds of conceptual complexity across physics, biology, psychology, and philosophy. From a biological perspective, the essence of this idea is that an individual's perceptual reality presents a mere caricature of its objectively verifiable existence. This can be readily appreciated through situations where individual perception obviously departs from objective reality, as in the case of many popular human visual (optical) illusions. Such images intrigue us because our perception of them so starkly contrasts with our cognitive understanding of what is actually true. That is, they reveal how our brains can err in making sense of the world around us.
In their review, consider the potential role of visual illusions in the biological world. That the human perceptual system builds verifiably imperfect caricatures of reality suggests the same for other organisms, which presents intriguing possibilities for visual communication. Could the appearance of prey be adaptively shaped to elicit illusionary perception in predators? Could mating signals have evolved to push the envelope of sexual advertisement through illusion? Could deceptive signals such as prey lures take advantage of such perceptual tricks? The overwhelming message from Kelley and Kelley's review is that-for most systems-current knowledge is too sparse to convincingly tell. There is, nevertheless, value in posing such issues to behavioral ecologists, not in the least because they force explicit consideration of perception as the ultimate canvas for signal evolution (see, e.g., Endler et al. 2010) . Behaviorists have increasingly accounted for the visual capabilities of relevant viewers (e.g., Stoddard and Prum 2011), thereby more accurately characterizing signal reception, but true perception only occurs once the eye's neurally encoded outputs arrive in the brain.
Empirically, the key issue is how to appraise perceptual illusions in the broader world. Humans identify such phenomena as mismatches between perception and cognitive expectation. The challenge with nonhuman animals is that we have an extremely limited basis for predicting when and how such mismatches might actually occur. One approach is to assess whether other species are tricked similarly to humans when presented with known illusionary phenomena (e.g., Murayama et al. 2012). However, as point out, there is great variation among species in this regard. Not only do
